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ABSTRACT 
Rationale, aims and objectives: In 2004, the pharmaceutical company Warner-Lambert paid 
US$430million to resolve criminal and civil legal liability for aggressive off-label marketing of 
gabapentin. Perhaps surprisingly, however, regulatory and legal concerns regarding the marketing of 
gabapentin has not significantly impacted upon the attitude of physicians towards using gabapentin 
for neuropathic pain. In this paper we attempt to understand the reasons for this discrepancy 
between clinical practice and regulatory/legal concerns through an analysis of published discussions 
about gabapentin prescribing. 
Methods: We performed a qualitative empirical analysis of the published clinical debate surrounding 
the use of gabapentin for the management of neuropathic pain.  
Results: The ongoing use of gabapentin for neuropathic pain use was primarily driven by the 
perception that it was a safe, non-addictive drug with few drug interactions, by possible similarities 
between the physiology of chronic pain and other neurological conditions, by the well-established 
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clinical precedent of using antiepileptic drugs in pain management, and by the lack of alternative 
options available in the market. Emerging evidence of lack of effectiveness and controversies about 
the integrity of the scientific record appeared to be of relatively little importance to practicing 
clinicians. 
Conclusions: Those who want to promote “rational” prescribing need to recognise that prescribing is 
driven by many factors other than epidemiological data and regulatory indications and that even 
intensely negative publicity about medicines may not penetrate clinical reasoning. This suggests that 
a range of measures may be needed to ‘incentivise’ rational prescribing and to promote research 
integrity. Regulators must be more sensitive to the contextual issues that are relevant to clinical 
practice when evaluating drugs for approval and developing guidelines.   
 
KEYWORDS: Chronic Pain; Neuralgia; Pain Management; Off-Label Use; Drug Industry; Physician’s 
Practice Patterns. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of “evidence-based medicine” (EBM) is now over 20 years old [1]. Over this time, the 
concept has evolved significantly. Whereas early versions of EBM emphasised principally 
epidemiological data, it is now broadly accepted that factors other than epidemiological evidence 
have a place in clinical decision-making [2]. This shift has occurred, in part, as a result of concerns 
that EBM in its original form was biased towards interventions and diseases that were reducible to 
quantifiable measures [3] and as a result that EBM inadvertently promoted ‘epistemic injustice’ by 
undervaluing physicians’ and patients’ roles as ‘knowers’ capable of making judgements outside of 
the confines of epidemiological evidence [4]. At the same time, physicians became more concerned 
about the formulaic nature of evidence-based practice [5], its focus on standardised rather than 
individualised clinical practices [6], and the fear it caused among clinicians about the legal 
consequences of practicing outside of clinical practice guidelines [7].  As a result of these criticisms, 
evidence based medicine has gradually been broadened to take account of patient values, 
physiological reasoning, and contextual considerations when making clinical judgements [8]. It is 
often not clear, however, exactly how the patient-centred, value-laden or contextual features of 
decision making are to be integrated with epidemiological evidence, and models of EBM are 
generally silent on this matter. In this article we will examine the ways in which clinicians have 
justified using gabapentin – a drug that is widely prescribed “off-label”—that is, prescribed outside 
the indications for which it has been formally approved by regulatory agencies [9]. By definition, 
prescribing outside of regulatory indications occurs when there is either not enough evidence to 
support registration for a particular indication, or there is evidence that has either not been 
presented to the regulator, or is contested. Off –label prescribing of gabapentin for neuropathic pain 
thus provides a useful means for examining the complex and value-laden nature of clinical decision-
making. 
Off-label prescribing of gabapentin 
Originally approved in 1993 as an adjunct therapy for partial seizures, gabapentin quickly became a 
popular drug for the treatment of neuropathic pain. The first clinical trial that assessed gabapentin’s 
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efficacy for neuropathic pain was published in 1996 and concluded that gabapentin provided pain 
relief and had the advantage of a low side-effect profile and low toxicity [10]. Studies published in 
subsequent years generally concluded in favour of gabapentin for neuropathic pain, the most 
important of which were two double blind, placebo controlled, randomised trials that investigated 
gabapentin for the treatment of diabetic neuropathy and postherpetic neuralgia [11, 12].  These 
trials reported that gabapentin was effective in the treatment of pain and sleep interference 
associated with pain, and also improved quality of life. A few years later a Cochrane review 
concluded that that while gabapentin was being increasingly used for neuropathic pain, it did not 
seem to be superior to other treatments, and the evidence base for the use of anticonvulsants in 
pain was generally lacking [13]. Other studies, however, were subsequently published that 
supported gabapentin’s use, and in 2005 a revised Cochrane review was published that was 
favourable of gabapentin [14]. 
While it appeared that the evidence for gabapentin’s effectiveness for the treatment of neuropathic 
pain was growing, it simultaneously became apparent that a strategic off-label marketing strategy 
was being used to increase sales. In 2004, the pharmaceutical company Warner-Lambert paid 
US$430million to resolve criminal and civil legal liability for aggressive marketing of gabapentin to 
treat ‘a wide array of ailments for which the drug was not approved’ [15]. It also became apparent 
that clinical trial data about gabapentin had likely been manipulated.  In 2009, a paper, co-authored 
by the Director of the US Cochrane Centre, was published that looked at bias in the reporting of 
industry sponsored gabapentin trials [16]. The authors concluded that the studies did ‘not meet the 
ethical standards for clinical research’, and that ‘reporting biases … increase[d] the likelihood that 
interventions will appear to be effective when they are not’. In response, the positive Cochrane 
review was rescinded, and revaluated data suggested that gabapentin was not as effective as it had 
previously been made out to be [17-20]. 
Regulatory agencies internationally have responded variably to this shifting data landscape. The FDA 
approved gabapentin for the treatment of postherpetic neuralgia, while Australia’s Therapeutic 
Goods Administration (TGA) and the UK’s Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA) approved gabapentin for neuropathic pain more generally. The TGA’s approval of 
gabapentin for neuropathic pain was based on studies demonstrating efficacy for postherpetic 
neuropathy and diabetic neuralgia [21]. The FDA, in contrast, were more reluctant to approve an 
indication as broad in scope as ‘neuropathic pain’, and set out their requirements for proof as 
follows [22]: 
“In order for a general neuropathic indication to be granted, the sponsor must provide 
evidence that the underlying disease process is similar for DPN [diabetic peripheral 
neuropathy], PHN [postherpetic neuralgia], and the pain of other neuropathic disorders 
and/or that the drug is effective for the neuropathic pain of all (or at least most) etiologies”. 
Given the (at best) equivocal evidence of benefit for the treatment of neuropathic pain, and the US 
regulator’s unwillingness to extend its label, one might expect that doctors would have felt “duped” 
and stop prescribing gabapentin for neuropathic pain (particularly in regions where regulators have 
not approved it for these indications). But in fact the contrary seemed to be true, and the use of 
gabapentin for neuropathic pain has continued largely with, for example 3.5 million gabapentin 
prescriptions being written annually in the England - an increase of 150% over 5 years [23, 24], and 
with authoritative clinical guidelines still recommending it as a first-line treatment for the 
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pharmacological management of neuropathic pain [25]. Further evidence of clinicians’ commitment 
to ongoing prescribing are evident in the criticism that has been levelled at payers for subsidising 
pregablin, but not the cheaper gabapentin, which is now off-patent. As an Australian clinical 
pharmacologist commented [26]: 
“Many patients with neuropathic pain have been paying very high prices for their 
gabapentin… the recent decision [to add pregablin to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme] 
has created the illogical situation in which long-standing users of gabapentin… will be paying 
more than patients being started on a much newer drug with less well established efficacy 
and safety”. 
This suggests that there are many drivers of prescription of gabapentin for neuropathic pain beyond 
data regarding its clinical effectiveness, and that it is a rich case study for understanding how the 
patient-centred, value-laden or contextual features of clinical decision-making are integrated with 
epidemiological evidence. In order to explore the clinical reasoning underpinning the ongoing 
prescribing of gabapentin for neuropathic pain, we performed a qualitative empirical analysis of the 
published clinical debate surrounding the use of gabapentin for the management of neuropathic 
pain. 
 
METHODS 
A Pubmed search was performed using the search terms ‘gabapentin & pain’, and ‘Neurontin & 
pain’. In order to elicit professional commentary, the search was limited to ‘comments’, ‘editorials’ 
and ‘letters’ in the English language. No time limitations were placed on the search which was 
performed on 4 August 2013. In total 116 articles were found from 61 different journals. The 
journals with the most articles identified were the Journal of Pain Symptom Management, Pain, and 
Anaesthesia & Analgesia respectively.   
To analyse the data, we drew both on Morse’s outline of the cognitive basis of qualitative research 
[27] and on Charmaz’s outline of data analysis in grounded theory [28]. This procedure involved 
immersion in the data to identify common themes. Throughout the data analysis, a process of 
constant comparison was employed to refine, enrich, and reorganise the emergent themes. 
Thematic saturation was reached after approximately 30 articles (that is, no new themes emerged 
after 30 articles had been analysed).  
 
RESULTS 
Scientific considerations 
Discussions among clinicians about prescribing gabapentin for neuropathic pain were striking in their 
lack of reference to the evidentiary concerns discussed above. Instead, discussions about the 
scientific merit of using gabapentin to treat neuropathic pain centred primarily on the physiology of 
chronic pain. The argument was consistently advanced by clinicians that, because both epilepsy and 
neuropathic pain originate from an ‘over-excitation’ in the nervous system, what worked for one of 
these diseases should also work for the other [29]. A similar justification was given for using other 
central nervous system drug classes such as antidepressants, and antipsychotics for the 
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management of neuropathic pain. Other clinicians focused on the fact that the mechanism of action 
of gabapentin remains officially unknown, and of the hypothesis, confirmed by studies, that 
neuropathic pain is not caused by one disease mechanism, but many, and therefore might be best 
managed by targeting multiple disease mechanisms at once. However since most pain medicines are 
rather ‘blunt’ tools that act as general anti-hyperanalgesics, it was argued that they couldn’t be used 
with any great accuracy [30].  This, in turn, seems to have contributed to heterogeneity in pain 
management practices—including the use of gabapentin—that Markus Klass and Marie Csete 
describe in the following terms [31]: 
“Practitioners choose from a bewildering array of ingredients to create their own menus, 
based on local taste and local experience, with little literature serving up a gold-standard, 
prize-winning combination”. 
To the extent that physicians were cognisant of epidemiological evidence, they focused on the ways 
in which researchers measure pain, on inconsistency of doses used in studies, and on the need to 
identify those patients who are most likely to benefit from gabapentin. 
Pain scores used to evaluate gabapentin’s effectiveness were considered by some to be too opaque, 
with stakeholders arguing for measures that have a self-evident clinical significance. Gehling and 
Tryba, in particular, argued that measures should be chosen so that statistically and clinically 
significant differences were one and the same [32]. When Serpell and colleagues published an RCT 
that claimed to provide ‘further evidence of the clinical utility of gabapentin, with significant 
beneficial effects on overall pain scores’ [33], McCleane contested the conclusion, noting that the 
overall pain score was only reduced by 0.5 on an 11 point scale, that this result was only just 
statistically significant, and that therefore the trial showed that gabapentin had ‘at best, a very 
modest analgesic effect’ [34].  
With respect to doses, Clendenen and Harrison noted inconsistencies  in the evidence base as ‘doses 
as small as 300mg have demonstrated efficacy, while in one study doses greater than 600mg did not 
demonstrate efficacy, and finally in the literature doses of up to 1200mg have demonstrated 
efficacy’ [35]. In another case, differences in observed results were resolved by arguing that in spite 
of discrepancies ‘both observations concur that there are patients for whom gabapentin can change 
the outcome’ [36], and further details about the effectiveness of gabapentin could only be acquired 
through controlled studies.  
Clinical considerations 
Clinical precedent was commonly cited as a justification for prescribing gabapentin. Henry McQuay 
and colleagues, for example, noted in their early review about the topic that anticonvulsants have 
been used for this indication since the 1960s [37]. The Cochrane review, likewise, which was co-
authored by several of the same authors, referenced this fact in its background information, as well 
as the clinical impression that anticonvulsants were useful for neuropathic pain [13]. Gabapentin 
was therefore not seen as a novel treatment, but rather as another treatment within a class of drugs 
that were already being used by clinicians in this way.  
Clinicians also made reference to what was believed to be a low side effect profile of gabapentin. 
This was seen to be particularly important given that the exact cause of pain is often not clear, so 
pain is generally managed empirically, with physicians trying various drug combinations at different 
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doses to find a successful treatment regimen [38-40]. It was also argued that because people with 
pain often suffer from underlying diseases, such as cancer, and are therefore often on other 
medications, this feature of gabapentin made it even more attractive [41] as it permited co-
administration of other medicines, including other analgesics [42]. Dubey, for example, stated his 
reasons for choosing gabapentin as follows [43]: 
“…we elected to use gabapentin in this case despite it being a costly agent because of its 
favorable safety profile and lack of drug interactions.” 
In further support of gabapentin’s clinical utility was its lower sedative effect which made it useful 
for treating patients who were at risk of being over-sedated [41], and the fact it was not considered 
to be an addictive drug, which can be a limiting factor to the use of opioid pain medicines. Finally, it 
was argued that pain was itself an obstacle to life-saving treatment and therefore had to be 
managed by whatever means were available [44, 45]. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The ongoing use of gabapentin for neuropathic pain use was primarily driven by physiological 
reasoning, by the perception that it was a safe drug with few drug interactions, by the well-
established precedent of using antiepileptic drugs in pain management, and by the lack of 
alternative options available in the market. Other factors that appeared to influence the use of 
gabapentin were the fact it is used for a chronic illness and therefore treatment could be reversed if 
necessary, the fact that it was not considered to be as addictive as opioids, and the view that 
because the cause of pain was not always clear, different treatments had to be tried to find a drug 
(or drug combination) that works.  
Taken together, our results demonstrate that at the coalface of health care, where physicians are 
confronted with the immediate clinical and moral dilemma of treating patients in severe and 
unresponsive pain in the absence of any single obviously effective treatment, there is seen to be a 
strong scientific and clinical case for prescribing gabapentin even in the absence of compelling 
epidemiological support.  
Although this did not emerge in debates about gabapentin, it is also likely that clinicians felt 
compelled to use gabapentin for neuropathic pain because chronic pain is a neglected disease of 
great significance. It has been noted, for example, that chronic pain affects a significant proportion 
of the population [46]; that it has enormous psychological, social and economic costs to individuals, 
families, health systems and society [46-50]; that it disproportionately affects those who are already 
disadvantaged [48]; and that a significant proportion of those who suffer from chronic pain do not 
receive appropriate pain relief with current medications [51].  
There are, therefore, a number of possible scientific, clinical, moral and socio-political explanations 
for ongoing prescribing of gabapentin for neuropathic pain despite accumulating scientific evidence 
that such prescribing might not be appropriate.  
Nevertheless, despite these explanations, one might have expected at least some evidence of a 
scientific or clinical ‘counter-narrative’, focused on emerging evidence of ineffectiveness, and a 
moral or political ‘counter-narrative’, focused on the influence of commercial interests on the 
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popularity of gabapentin. These lacunae are particularly surprising given the intensity of the legal 
controversy about off-label promotion of gabapentin, the US Department of Justice’s conviction of 
the manufacturer, and the coverage in the media of claims of scientific and publishing misconduct 
on the part of gabapentin’s manufacturers. It seems unlikely, therefore, that doctors were unaware 
they were prescribing gabapentin off-label, or that companies had engaged in unethical promotion 
and manipulation of published data, and some other explanation is required. 
One possible explanation for this lack of critical reflection on emerging evidence and on industry 
misbehaviour is that off-label promotion of gabapentin for neuropathic pain has been highly 
successful—so successful in fact that even major lawsuits and claims of data manipulation have not 
been able to shake clinicians’ conviction that gabapentin should be used to treat neuropathic pain. 
This, combined with the belief that chronic neuropathic pain is a serious unmet need—a belief that 
may itself be partly constructed by industry promotion—might render clinicians essentially blind to 
both contrary evidence about both efficacy and safety, and alternative ways of treating neuropathic 
pain. Given that clinicians are currently free to prescribe as they see fit, with regulatory labels being 
at most a guide, it might not be at all surprising that clinicians would be successfully influenced by 
industry in this way.  
Practical implications 
This analysis supports the notion that the promotion of rational prescribing cannot rely on 
regulatory standards, and associated “labels” to guide practice. The gabapentin case also shows the 
extent to which the clinical discourse can be removed from scientific and legal discourses—even 
when the latter call into question the very integrity of those who have generated the evidence for or 
against prescribing. There are four practical implications that arise from close examination of the 
case of gabapentin.  
First, while off-label prescribing is not, in-and-of-itself, undesirable, the extent of off-label 
prescribing of gabapentin in the face of emerging evidence against its use suggests that rational 
prescribing may be immensely difficult without the use of incentives and counter-incentives to 
combat unwarranted commercial influence. These might include “sticks”, such as punishment for 
excessive prescribing of drugs off-label in the absence of compelling scientific or clinical reasons to 
do so; “carrots”, such as rewarding those who prescribe ‘appropriately’; more stringent controls of 
third party reimbursement systems; and stronger, more binding, regulation.  
Second, it is important that the ‘right’ research is done, and that this research reflects clinical need 
rather than commercial interest.  This would need to be followed by regulatory processes that assess 
evidence on the basis of clinical need rather than on the basis of commercial viability. This would 
require greater public funding and ownership of late-stage research, combined with more 
sophisticated methods of evaluating evidence, so that results can potentially be applied to a broad 
range of related diseases, not only the immediate disease being studied. Currently this type of 
analogical reasoning is exclusively applied by doctors, at their own risk.  
Third, the gabapentin case illustrates the need for more sophisticated measures to ensure the 
integrity of science and of the scientific record, so that those who have the means to produce 
knowledge do not engineer the choices available to physicians according to their own private 
interests. Jerry Ravetz describes the corruption of scientific research as follows [52]: 
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‘At every phase of the process, science now becomes problematic and compromised. 
Priorities for research are set not by scientists but by the external interests that supply 
funds… Applications are directed to the furtherance of profit and power; issues of safety and 
ethics are seen as secondary. Regulation… comes after the event… and is therefore 
characteristically too little and too late.”  
Steps are being taken to address some of these concerns. Clinical trial registries (such as 
ClinicalTrials.gov and EU Clinical Trials Register) have been set up to raise awareness of privately and 
publicly funded trials, not only those that industry chooses to publish. In support of this initiative, in 
2005, the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors began to require that trials submitted 
for publication had to be registered, and in 2006 the World Health Organisation recommended that 
all clinical trials should be registered [53]. WHO also recommended a list of 20 data fields that all 
clinical trials should report on, and developed a search portal intended to be a single point of access 
for information about ongoing and completed clinical trials [53]. Efforts such as these clearly need to 
be institutionalised and perhaps extended (e.g. requiring all publications to include a data 
completeness clause so that we know when the data has been selectively chosen for publication; 
requiring more information about the context of the research; and promoting timely and robust 
post-publication review).  
Finally, the gabapentin case demonstrates that ultimately there needs to be a change in medical 
culture so that doctors learn to ask the hard questions about “unmet needs” and all the possible 
ways of meeting them (versus the way drug companies construct unmet needs and their solutions). 
For instance, it may be true that neuropathic pain is an “orphan” disease in need of a 
pharmacological solution, but this is certainly not the entire story. While a drug that does not harm 
and is relatively inexpensive might provide an additional therapeutic option to physicians and an 
excellent business opportunity for industry, on the other hand it may also be a futile approach that 
uses up limited health care resources and precludes other, more effective approaches.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Clinicians prescribing gabapentin off-label do so for many reasons, but trustworthy clinical trial 
evidence—or lack thereof—does not appear to be one of these reasons. Rather, the decision to 
prescribe gabapentin is made primarily on physiological and clinical grounds, and is likely 
encouraged by the moral and socio-political imperative to treat chronic pain and by off-label 
promotion. This demonstrates the complexity of clinical decision-making. It also raises questions 
about whether clinicians need to be made more accountable for their decision-making and, if so, 
how. We believe that, while prescribing gabapentin for neuropathic pain may be relatively harmless, 
the practice reflects a worrying lack of cognisance among clinicians of the factors influencing their 
decision-making.  What is needed, therefore, is a means to make these influences more transparent. 
At the same time, the socio-political and commercial factors that shape the evidence-base, 
especially in instances where decision stakes are high, need to be given as much emphasis as the 
data itself, and researchers and regulators need to be more sensitive to the questions that really 
concern clinicians, so that regulatory “labels”, and the guidelines that stem from them, are clinically 
meaningful.  
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